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DDS&T-168-83

1 MAR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Public Affairs Division

FROM: R. E. Hineman
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Oral Presentation - Appearance Before
Non-Government Group - []

STAT

1. Under the provisions of [] the attached oral presentation by [], FBIS/DDS&T to the Middle Atlantic Regional Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies on 5 March 1983 is approved.

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2. The content of this presentation has been reviewed by this office and is considered unclassified and consistent with established policies of the Agency and the U.S. Government.

3. Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact this office directly.

STAT

[]
R. E. Hineman
yes

Attachment:
As stated

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FBIS-203-83
16 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

VIA: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Chief, Analysis Group, FBIS

FROM:

STAT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentation

1. I request approval to present orally remarks based on the attached text entitled "Soviet Views of Post-Mao China."

2. When approved, I intend to give the presentation at a panel at the Middle Atlantic Regional Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies on 5 March in Princeton, New Jersey. The panel's other participants are of FBIS, Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University, Kenneth Lieberthal of Swarthmore College, and Thomas Robinson of Georgetown University.

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3. None of the material in the paper is, to my knowledge, classified.

4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an Agency employee but will append the standard disclaimer indicating that the views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the Agency.

STAT

Attachment:
As stated

I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge, have found it to be unclassified.

Director, FBIS

16 FEB 1983

Date

STAT

I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge, have found it to be unclassified and approve it for presentation orally.

STAT

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

28 Feb 83
Date

1394-83

5-1716-83

Princeton AAASS Presentation, 5 March 1983
"Soviet Views of Post-Mao China"

The influence of Soviet scholars and mid-level officials on Soviet policy is a subject of debate among Western academics. Evidence suggests that Soviet sinologists have influenced Soviet policy toward China in the post-Mao period; they have provided alternative views of developments in China and in some cases, the formulations first specified by low-level academics and officials have been reflected in the public statements of Soviet leaders.
 (citations: Pope, Soviet Foreign Affairs Specialists, Remnek, Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy, Eran The Mezhdunarodniki)

After the death of Mao in September 1976, two conflicting interpretations of post-Mao China emerged among Soviet China-watchers:

- "Maoism without Mao": Changes made by the new Chinese leadership were not significant. The domestic policies of the new leadership essentially represented a reinstitution of capitalism. In foreign policy, the new Chinese leadership maintained an anti-Soviet, pro-Western approach. If anything, the new leadership was even more anti-Soviet than Mao.
 (Citations: Borisov, Kommunist, 1977; "China after Mao", Kommunist, 1977, "China after Mao," Problemy dalnego vostoka, 1977; other articles in Problemy dalnego vostoka in 1977 and 1978)
- "Return toward Socialism": Changes made by the new Chinese leadership were significant. The domestic policies of the new leadership essentially represented a return to the policies of the 1950's when China was building socialism. The new Chinese leadership would eventually assume a less hostile posture toward the USSR because of the requirements of domestic development and the international situation.
 (Citations: Bovin and Delyusin, Soviet television, August 1977; Bovin, Soviet radio, February 1977, Burlatskiy, Novyy Mir, 1978)

During 1978 and 1979, Soviet policy toward China was apparently based on the first view. Chinese actions -- specifically the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty, the establishment of relations with the U.S. and Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam -- reinforced this view. Soviet comment on these events and particularly on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam illustrates the differences in interpretation provided by advocates of the two images:

- The defenders of the status quo ("Maoism without Mao") predicted the invasion and claimed it was the logical result of Chinese foreign policies. They charged that the U.S. and PRC had cooperated in planning and carrying out the invasion.
 (citations: Tass reports, 8 and 29 January 1979; "I. Aleksandrov," 10 and 28 February, Pravda)
- The advocates of change ("Return toward Socialism") failed to predict the invasion and later admitted their error. They argued that the PRC would not invade Vietnam because of domestic opposition, the restraining influence of the United States and other countries, and the potential costs of the operation.
 (citations: Kudryavtsev, interview in Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 January 1979; Bovin and Zamyatin, Soviet television, 27 January 1979, Bovin, Sankai Shimbun, April 1979)

- In the aftermath of the invasion, Soviet leadership statements on China were among the harshest ever. Some soviet leaders criticized the Chinese leadership in terms which echoed the formulations of the defenders of the status quo. Other commentary, including statements by the advocates of change, converged in attacking China.

(Citations: Soviet election speeches in February 1979, especially those by Brezhnev, Suslov, Ustinov; comments by Bovin, Borisov, and others in March-April, 1979 on Soviet radio and in the press)

In April, the Chinese proposed Sino-Soviet talks and in October, the talks began. Soviet leadership perceptions of the Chinese leadership and their actions in 1978-1979 made them wary of the talks and perhaps precluded the possibility of significant progress during the talks.

(Citations: comments by Bovin, Borisov, Aleksandrov, Shishlin on Soviet radio and television and in the press)

Even before the talks began in 1979, Soviet specialist literature on China again reflected a divergence of views among Soviet china-watchers. In mid-1980, Soviet leadership comment on China began to incorporate elements of the more optimistic view of China.

(citations: Brezhnev speeches in August 1980, February 1981 and March 1982; comments by Bovin, Borisov, Shishlin, Aleksandrov and others in Soviet media.)